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We examine whether changes in sovereign credit assessments help to determine international 
bank flows to emerging countries. We focus on the banking flows of G7 countries to a sample 
of 55 emerging market borrowers for 1995-2008. We find evidence indicating that sovereign 
credit rating revisions have significant and positive influences on international bank flows 
from developed markets even after controlling for other determinants. In addition, we find 
strong regional rating spillover effects. Ratings improvements in one emerging market region 
tends to reduce bank flows to the other regions. However, there is an exception from the Asia 
Pacific to Eastern Europe.   
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International bank flows provide the necessary external financing for firms in 
emerging markets as these economies transition through stages of financial development. 
Banks in more developed countries have channeled significant funds to emerging market 
borrowers in recent years, creating a phenomenal risk exposure for the global banking system. 
Yet the importance of the banking sector for accelerating economic growth is widely 
recognized (Levine and Zervos 1998). Hence, a clearer understanding of the determinants of 
international banking activities in emerging markets is of global interest and crucial for 
supporting the financial and economic development of the world economy.   
In the current literature assessing the determinants of cross-border banking claims 
(e.g., Herrero and Martinez-Peria 2007; Papaioannou 2009), the significant roles of geography 
and informational asymmetries, sound economic performance, banking sector development, 
institutional quality, and political stability have been investigated.  However, despite their 
documented influence on various segments of financial markets (Kaminsky and Schmukler 
1999; Kim and Wu 2008) and regulatory importance for bank capital adequacy assessment 
under the Basel II framework, the role of sovereign credit ratings in influencing international 
bank flows has not been previously examined. A timely assessment is needed in light of 
recent criticisms on rating agencies’ complicity in the subprime crisis. 
Based on the theoretical work of Diamond (1984), it is well accepted that financial 
institutions play a crucial delegated monitoring role in financial intermediation. We find 
evidence in this study that in international bank lending this monitoring role is partially shared 
with rating agencies. Boot, Milbourne and Schmeits (2006) show that agency credit ratings 
are used as signals for financial decision making and credit rating agencies serve a monitoring 
role. Thus, in theory, credit rating assessments should reduce the information generation 
efforts and information asymmetry faced by international banks, making them more inclined 
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to enter into loan contracts with borrowers in emerging markets. This could work either 
directly through sovereign ratings’ information content on banks’ local country risks or 
indirectly through an implicit sovereign ceiling for all the credits of a country (see Durbin and 
Ng 2006). In support of the informational value of credit ratings, Merrill Lynch (1999) 
purports that credit rating agencies can help lenders to ”pierce the fog” of asymmetric 
information that surrounds lending relationships. In related lines of inquiry, previous studies 
such as Yi and Mullineaux (2006) find that syndicated bank loan ratings are informative for 
financial market participants, and Kim and Wu (2008) find emerging countries with better 
sovereign ratings were associated with more developed banking sectors.  
In this article, we examine whether sovereign credit rating assessments have 
informational value for cross-border bank lending decisions. It is well accepted that sovereign 
credit rating assessments provided by rating agencies are based on fundamental aspects of a 
country’s debt history and macroeconomic performance (Cantor and Packer 1996). Hence, 
sovereign credit ratings are used as reference measures for individual country’s 
creditworthiness. In recognizing this, much of the literature on sovereign credit ratings 
focuses on their short-term information content for financial market returns and linkages (see, 
e.g., Kaminsky and Schmukler 1999; Brooks et al. 2004). However, it is also understood that 
there are many other factors simultaneously influencing a country’s debt repayment ability 
including political and other expropriation risks, exchange rate volatility, and currency 
controls and legal and institutional quality (Butler and Fauver 2006). This comprehensive 
assessment makes sovereign credit ratings a vital determinant of international bank lending to 
emerging markets. We examine this issue by focusing on the quarterly changes in bank claims 
of G7 countries on an extensive sample of 55 emerging markets and use Standard & Poor’s 
(S&P) sovereign credit rating assessments from Q1:1995 - Q4:2008. 1  
                                                 
1 In addition to S&P we also considered the ratings measures produced by other rating agencies like Moodys and 
Fitch Ratings. However, we opted to use the S&P measures as they cover a larger number of sovereigns and are 
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We find strong evidence indicating that sovereign credit rating revisions and, to a 
lesser extent, outlook changes have significant positive influences on international bank flows 
from developed markets - even after controlling for the potential influences of various proxies 
for informational asymmetries, financial and economic development, openness, and 
governance quality in an extended gravity model specification. Specifically, sovereign rating 
revisions on foreign-currency-denominated debt is more influential for bank flows to 
investment-grade borrowers, whereas lending decisions to non-investment-grade countries 
appear to be swayed more by revisions on local currency ratings as the latter is designed to 
reflect a country’s fundamental prospects and the former reflects the sovereign obligor’s 
ability to repay debt in hard currencies. Furthermore, our results suggest that geographical 
proximity and cultural and legal linkages are only important for ameliorating informational 
asymmetries in more risky lending decisions to borrowers from non-investment-grade 
countries. International lenders have a clear preference for targeting riskier emerging markets 
that are closer to their borders and share their own cultural and legal backgrounds. In addition, 
they tend to orientate their non-investment-grade lending toward countries with lower 
governance quality and tighter foreign exchange controls. The reverse is true of bank flows to 
investment-grade countries.  
Finally, we report significant competitive rating spillover effects, with G7’s bank 
flows to emerging markets declining in response to improvements in credit conditions of 
other emerging market regions. However, there is some evidence that currency rating 
spillover effects are more heterogeneous before 2004 when rating improvements in Asia and 
Eastern Europe significantly lifted the bank flows to other emerging market regions. Taken 
together, sovereign credit ratings have unequivocal informational value for international bank 
lenders.  
                                                                                                                                                        
re-rated more frequently. Furthermore, the literature reports that the sovereign credit ratings provided by S&P 
generally leads that of the other agencies and hence, have greater market impacts (see, e.g., Brooks et al. 2004; 
Gande and Parsley 2005). 
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In spite of the large volume of studies on international banking, our study is to the best 
of our knowledge the first to explicitly analyze the impact of agency ratings 2  and their 
spillover effects on the flow of those banking claims. The more traditional strand of the 
sovereign ratings literature examines the role of sovereign rating revisions during major 
episodes of financial market contagion (Kaminsky and Schmukler 2002;  Chiang, Jeon, and 
Li  2007), and it remains a concern whether sovereign rating changes are procyclical and 
exacerbate cross-market comovements during times of financial crises. Nonetheless, it is 
recognized in a relatively newer strand of the sovereign ratings literature that sovereign rating 
changes for individual countries have significant informational spillover effects across other 
international debt and equity markets (Gande and Parsley 2005; Ferreira and Gama 2007). It 
is this latter strand of the literature that we follow in our rating spillover analysis, as it is more 
appropriate for understanding the wide-reaching effects on international bank flows that are 
available at a much lower frequency than for financial returns and their short-term 
correlations.  
There are important implications in this research for financial institutions 
management, international portfolio choice and international banking regulations. Our study 
contributes a much-needed new perspective on international banking under the Basel II 
regulatory framework for assessing bank risks, whereby sovereign credit ratings have been 
introduced as a gauge for banks’ lending activities (ultimately their risky assets).  Our results 
have clear policy implications for future reforms to strengthen the international financial 
architecture as they suggest the role of sovereign ratings should be maintained in financial 
risk assessments in emerging markets where there are greater informational asymmetries in 
cross-border lending decisions. Furthermore, our findings suggest that public debt 
                                                 
2 Although International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) indicators are used by Papaioannou (2009) and Herrero 
and Martinez-Peria (2007), among a host of other determinants, sovereign credit ratings provided by rating 
agencies have never been explored to our best knowledge. 
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management strongly affects banking sector financing in emerging markets and can 
significantly help encourage the flow of funds from rich to poor countries. 
 
II. Data Descriptions 
 Sovereign Ratings 
We study a sample of 55 emerging market countries from four key geographical 
regions –Asia-Pacific (AP), Latin America (LA), Africa/Middle East (AME) and Emerging 
Europe (EE) rated by S&P from Q1:1995 to Q4:2008 (see Table A1 in Appendix A for our 
country list). The sovereign credit rating assessments provided by S&P includes long-term 
sovereign credit ratings and associated outlooks and credit watches for both foreign-currency- 
and local-currency-denominated sovereign debt.3 The highest rating on the S&P rating scale 
is AAA and the lowest is D/SD (default or selective default) and the ratings are published 
with ratings outlooks ranging from Credit Watch–Positive to Credit Watch–Negative. The 
investment grade ratings are BBB- and above and the ratings BB+ and below are non-
investment grade. Whilst ratings are reviewed regularly by rating agencies, re-ratings are 
made only in exceptional circumstances when the agencies perceive a permanent fundamental 
change in a country’s credit quality. Specifically, rating guidance is either in the form of a 
change in the ratings or issue of outlooks and credit watches with the former indicating an 
actual change in the perceived credit quality of a sovereign obligor and the latter indicating a 
potential rating change in the near term.  
In order to facilitate empirical analyses, the S&P sovereign ratings and outlooks/credit 
watches are linearly transformed following Cantor and Packer (1996) and Gande and Parsley 
(2005) into separate (quarterly) time series for each of the sample countries in two steps. First, 
                                                 
3 Although ratings on short-term sovereign debt are available and are examined in prior studies, we do not 
examine their effects in this study as international bank lending is dominated by maturities of two years or more. 
A focused assessment on long-term rating impacts reduces potential maturity mismatch in our analyses. 
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we allocate numerical values for each of the rating grades which vary from 20 for AAA and 0 
for default and selected default. We then investigate the roles of the long-term ratings and 
intermediate outlooks separately for the purpose of explaining the G7 bank flows to the 55 
emerging market economies. Hence, we begin by generating four daily time series for each 
sample country based on the ratings and outlooks on their foreign- and local-currency-
denominated debt. We assign the announced rating and outlook values to and from the days of 
rating revisions until the date of the next rating event. For example, S&P changed the long-
term foreign currency rating of Brazil from BB with positive outlook to BB+ with positive 
outlook on 16 May 2007, and then to BBB- on 30 April 2008. We allocate 10 (the numeric 
value assigned to BB+) for the days between 16 May 2007 and 29 April 2008, and 11 (the 
value for BBB-) for 30 April 2008 and beyond. The quarterly ratings are then generated by 
averaging daily ratings for each quarter. The outlook series are generated in a similar fashion.  
Secondly, consistent with the literature, we use an aggregate (comprehensive) measure of the 
linearly transformed ratings and outlooks to investigate the potential of inter-regional ratings 
information spillover effects in bank flows to emerging markets. The extant literature 
documents significant ratings spillover effects in international debt and stock markets (Gande 
and Parsley 2005; Ferreira and Gama 2007, respectively). Our study thus significantly adds to 
this literature by providing new results on credit rating spillover effects at the regional level 
and for cross-border bank flows. We generate the comprehensive credit ratings measure for 
our regional spillover analyses by adjusting each rating score with its associated outlook value 
over time. For example, the rating score of CC with negative outlook will be allocated an 
aggregate score of 0.75 (1, which is the score of CC rating, minus 0.25, which is the score for 





G7 Bank Flow Variables 
We investigate the role of sovereign ratings on the bank flows from G7 countries’ 
lending banks to a group of 55 emerging market countries. We rely on the most 
comprehensive source of international banking data that is currently available and that is 
provided by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in their Consolidated Banking 
Statistics dataset. The BIS collects data on foreign claims extended by international banks 
from more than 20 developed BIS-reporting countries. These on-balance sheet claims cover 
not only direct bank loans extended from bank headquarters but also by bank branches and 
subsidiaries in foreign markets as well as banks’ holdings of debt securities and other assets. 
However, we focus specifically on G7 countries due to their dominance in international bank 
lending to emerging markets. The banking flow data used are the quarterly changes in the G7 
banks’ foreign claims on each of our 55 target emerging markets as reported in the BIS’s 
consolidated banking statistics (Table 9B: Consolidated foreign claims of reporting banks - 
immediate borrower basis).4  In using this data, we can accurately capture the risk exposures 
of G7 national banking systems to our wide sample of emerging markets.  
 
Control Variables 
We narrow the list of potential explanatory variables by firstly considering those 
control variables that would be of direct relevance to international bank flows as suggested by 
the existing literature and would not be collinear with our rating and outlook variables. Our 
                                                 
4 In addition, the BIS reports foreign banking claims in ultimate risk basis (Table 9D), which includes data on 
some off-balance sheet exposures of domestic banks. However, this database currently omits Germany, one of 
the more important G7 countries and so we opt to not use this dataset for our investigation. However, as a 
robustness check, we also re-estimate our models for the remaining six major developed countries using the 
alternative database on foreign claims on ultimate borrower basis. The estimation results are qualitatively the 
same for both measures of foreign bank claims. 
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control variables can be broadly categorized into four groups - bilateral linkages, financial and 
economic development, financial openness and governance standards. 
 
Bilateral Linkages. We first account for informational control variables that are customarily 
used in cross-border banking studies. These should help to reduce model misspecification 
errors from the omission of important variables. To minimize problems with multicollinearity, 
we also examine correlations between individual control variables (which are not 
unreasonably high). The details on all variables used are provided in Table B1 in Appendix B. 
  
 The literature on international bank flows borrows from the international trade 
literature a “gravity model” which essentially addresses various measures of linkages between 
target and donor countries (see, e.g., Buch 2005). According to these types of models, 
bilateral trade or capital flows between two countries is inversely related to geographical 
distance as in the case of lending, the further away is a borrower, the more difficult it becomes 
for the lender to monitor and gather information to assess credit risks. Variables which 
capture trade restrictions and other information costs (asymmetries) are usually also added. 
These include cultural and legal linkages and also economic linkages such as total trade flows 
between the pair. There is much empirical evidence within international finance to support the 
idea that these proxies for information asymmetry (or familiarity) significantly influence 
cross-border exchanges of financial assets (Portes and Rey 2005) or affect economic 
outcomes and financial activities (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2006; La Porta et al. 1997). 
We anticipate that G7 lenders based in countries sharing a similar cultural background or 
legal environment with a borrower may have less of an informational disadvantage in their 
lending decisions. Hence, we include variables to capture bilateral geographical, economical, 
political and cultural linkages in the spirit of these gravity models.  
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 First, we employ a geographical distance (DIST) measure between a donor (G7) and a 
target (emerging market) country measured in (natural log) kilometers to control for 
geographical proximity. 5  Second, is the total value of merchandise trade in natural logs 
(TOTTRADE) between each country pair calculated in both directions (sum of import from 
and export to each of the 55 emerging countries from the viewpoint of G7 countries). Third, 
we use the amount of official aid flows donated (DON) from each G7 country to a target 
emerging market as a proxy for the political ties between the rich and poor nations. It is 
conceivable that bilateral political ties may flow down to influence a country’s bank lending 
program. There is sufficient evidence to suggest that political connections are associated with 
preferential access to contractual based debt financing within many developing countries (see 
Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell 2006 and references therein). The political dimension of 
bilateral linkages has not previously been investigated in studies on cross-border financial 
flows but we argue is worth considering. It is likely that international bank lenders would 
factor into their lending decisions their own government’s political and economic support for 
a political ally as they may at the very least, feel more comfortable with extending credit to 
these markets if not count on an implicit guarantee from their own government. Lastly, we 
consider several cultural linkage dummies between each of the 55 emerging market countries 
with G7 countries. There are four dummy variables that take the value of one if there is a 
shared link between an emerging country and one of the G7 countries and zero otherwise. We 
consider 1) English as a business or official language (Stulz and Williamson 2003), 2) 
Membership of the European Union, 3) Use of a Common Law legal framework and 4) Civil 
Law legal origin (La Porta et al. 1997).   
                                                 
5 The geographical distance between two countries (a donor country and a recipient country) can be accurately 
measured using the great circle distance formula which is given below (in kilometers): 
1637)LongCos(Long)Cos(Lat)Cos(Lat)Sin(Lat)(LatArcCos(SinDistance ijjijiij ×−××+×= ,  
where Lat and Long are the latitude and longitude of the capital city of each country,pair and the subscripts i and 
j denote the two countries in each pair-wise calculation. A similar approach has been adopted in prior work by 




Financial and Economic Development 
 In this category, we employ several measures for financial and economic 
development. In traditional gravity model specifications, the size of the target country’s 
economy (or population) is typically included as a determinant as it is thought that larger 
economies would exert greater pulling power for trade or bank flows. Hence, we include log 
GDP (LGDP) as a measure of economic development (Herrero and Martinez-Peria 2007). 
Consistent with the literature on financial development we also use stock market 
capitalization in natural logs (SMCAP) as a measure on a non-bank source of finance and the 
extent of financial market development (Rajan and Zingales 2003).  Moreover, we control for 
stock market performance in the target country’s emerging market region (RSINDEXCH).6 
Furthermore, we employ domestic credit provided by the banking sector in natural logs 
(BANKCRED) as a proxy for the size and development of the banking sector in each target 
country (Levine and Zervos 1998). We then employ two measures of banking sector 
efficiency and stability, interest rate spread (INTSPREAD) (i.e. difference between lending 
and deposit rates) and the ratio of liquid reserves to total assets (LIQTOASSET) respectively 
(see Claessens and Laeven 2004 and references therein).  
 
Financial Openness 
 We also include measures of international capital flows that may compete with bank 
flows – foreign direct investments (FDI) and portfolio investment inflows (PORTFOLIO) 
both in natural logs (Bekaert and Wang 2009). The effect of these alternative forms of capital 
flows are uncertain a priori as they could either present competitive effects on international 
bank financing or more generally  indicate a greater degree of financial openness in target 
                                                 
6 We omit reporting the regression results with national stock market returns as comparable stock market indices 
for our entire sample period are available for less than half of our emerging market sample. However, sub-
sample regression results for national stock market returns are available upon request.  
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countries (Bekaert and Wang 2009). Hence, we also include two alternative measures of 
investment restrictions – on direct investments (DBARR) and financial credits (FBARR). We 
also control for foreign exchange regulations that may hinder capital flows. Countries in our 
sample exercised a wide spectrum of exchange rate and monetary policy arrangements that 
have different degrees of controls of international capital flows. For example, countries that 
have dollarized their currencies and the ones with a currency board arrangement would 
experience a lower degree of capital flows than countries that have a floating exchange rate 
system. We control for this by introducing a foreign exchange regime indicator variable, 
FXREGM, with values ranging from 0 to 4 (0 = floating systems, 1 = crawling pegs, 2 = pegs 
to one or more currencies, 3 = currency board system, and 4 = dollarization).    
 
Governance Quality 
 Finally, we control in aggregate for various governance issues that may arise during 
the process of financial development and impact upon international capital flows. We employ 
the World Bank governance indicators which are designed to measure six dimensions of 
governance: voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulation 
quality, rule of law and control of corruption. In these series, a higher value is indicative of 
better governance in that particular dimension. The details of the construction of these 
measures are to be found in Kauffman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009. This is one of the most 
comprehensive compilations of data on governance across time and countries currently 
available. Following Butler and Fauver (2006), we sum the six separate dimensions into a 






III. Empirical model 
Overall Impact of Sovereign Ratings Information 
We start with an overall panel data estimation of the G7 bank flows where the 
influence of the long-term sovereign ratings and outlooks for both foreign- and local-
currency-denominated debt are investigated (separately). 7  The extended gravity model 
specification in equation (1) is estimated with random effects as fixed effects estimation is 
inappropriate in cases where some of the regressors (for example, the distance and cultural 
linkage measures) are time invariant. 
𝐺7𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑖,𝑡𝑗= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ ∆𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∙ ∆𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + �𝛽𝑘 ∙ 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙_𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑠𝑖,𝑡𝑘𝑝
𝑘=3+ � 𝛽𝑘 ∙ 𝐹𝑖𝑛_𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑚𝑡𝑖,𝑡𝑘𝑞
𝑘=10
+ � 𝛽𝑘 ∙ 𝐹𝑖𝑛_𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑡𝑘𝑟
𝑘=16
+ 𝛽20 ∙ 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡 
(1) 
 
G7BankFlows are the quarterly changes in foreign claims of G7 countries’ banks (j = Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, U.K. and U.S.) against each of the 55 emerging market 
countries (i = 1 to 55) from Q1:1995 to Q4:2008. , 1i tCR −∆  and , 1i tOutlook −∆  are last quarter’s 
changes in long-term sovereign ratings and rating outlooks on foreign- and local-currency-
denominated sovereign debt respectively. Local and foreign currency ratings and outlooks are 
estimated separately in Eq. (1). _Bilateral links is the set of bilateral linkage variables for 
geographical, trade, political and cultural ties between the G7 country and each target 
emerging market. _Fin devmt  is the set of proxies for the level of financial and economic 
development in each emerging market (log GDP, stock market capitalization, domestic bank 
                                                 
7 In our application, endogeneity is not an issue for two reasons. First, in most cases, ratings changed less 
frequently than the bank flows. As such if rating events are not concentrated around the end of each quarter, our 
changes in rating variables precede the dependent variable in the same quarter anyway. On top of this, we use the 
rating changes from the past quarter. Thus, we argue that our rating variables in the model are exogenous to the 
bank flows. Therefore, endogeneity of our ratings variable is less of a concern in our estimations. 
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lending, interest rate spread, liquidity ratio of bank assets and stock market performance). 
_Fin open is the set of variables capturing the degree of financial openness in target emerging 
markets (FDI, portfolio investment inflows, direct investment barriers, financial barriers and 
foreign exchange controls). Lastly, Gov  is Butler and Fauver’s (2006) composite measure for 
governance quality covering the six dimensions of accountability, political stability, 
government effectiveness, regulation quality, rule of law and corruption assessed by the 
World Bank’s governance indicators (in Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi  2009).  
We anticipate that, in general, the sovereign credit rating variables (for both local and 
foreign currencies) should have a significant positive influence on the G7 bank flows (i.e. 
positive coefficients on rating-based variables). This is because of the important leadership 
role governments play in the early stages of market development in many emerging market 
countries. In some circumstances, governments’ fiscal positions (debt repayment ability) can 
play a crucial role in providing various financial and non-financial safety nets to companies 
that are considered to be of some national significance (e.g., utility or national resource 
companies) even if the sovereign ceiling does not always hold in emerging markets (Durbin 
and Ng 2006). As such, improvements in sovereign governments’ fiscal positions (as 
evidenced by improvements in ratings guidance) can be expected to have a positive effect on 
the G7 bank flows to those countries.  
Emerging markets typically suffer from ‘original sin’ and are forced to borrow in 
international currencies like the US dollar and Euros for financing their domestic activities. 
As such, sovereign credit ratings on foreign currency debt primarily capture the perceived 
ability of a sovereign obligor to service its financial obligations in hard currencies. On the 
other hand, local currency credit ratings are a better reflection of inflationary risks and the 
fundamental health of the local economy as governments can generally increase taxes to avoid 




Comparison of Investment and Non-Investment-Grade Ratings 
We also investigate the possibility that different rating grades may have differential 
impacts on international bank flows. The patterns of bank flows could be markedly different 
depending on whether the sovereign of the borrower country has an investment grade rating 
or not as there are often references in financial regulations that establish a specific use of 
credit ratings. For example, some financial institutions may face binding exposure limits on 
non-investment grade assets. Another reason could be that national governments often act as a 
lender of last resort and the ones with investment grade ratings are seen to provide better 
implicit protection for their domestic borrowers. 8  Hence, we also estimate equation (1) 
separately for the two categories of countries - those with investment grade ratings (BBB- or 
the assigned numerical value of 10 and above) based on foreign then local currency ratings  
and those of non-investment grade sovereigns (BB+ or the assigned numerical value of nine 
and below) in each quarter.  
 
Regional Spillover Effects of Ratings 
In addition to the above investigation of the overall influence of ratings and outlooks 
on bank flows, it is also important to examine potential spillover impacts of ratings 
information across emerging market regions. The G7 bank flows to an emerging market may 
depend not only on the target country’s own ratings but also on the ratings of other emerging 
market regions. There is the potential of a ‘crowding out effect’ in bank loans to emerging 
markets. That is, if lending banks have allocated a fixed proportion of their loan portfolios to 
emerging market regions as a whole then an increase in bank flows to one region (due to a 
rating revision) would crowd out the flows into other regions. Alternatively, an increase 
                                                 
8 However, countries that have dollarized or have a very strong form of a currency peg (e.g., a currency board) 
may lack this capability. In our sample, countries belonging to the former are Ecuador, El Salvador and Panama, 
and the countries for the latter include Bulgaria, Estonia, Hong Kong and Lithuania. 
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(decrease) in bank flows to one region may coincide with similar increases (decreases) in 
other regions if an overall increase (decrease) in the credit allocation to emerging market 
borrowers is the source of the rise. For example, during the various episodes of financial 
crises in the late 1990s, emerging markets as a group experienced net international banking 
outflows (a total reduction of BIS reporting banks’ claims to the tune of US$247.3 billion 
over 1998-1999). However, the net banking inflows that started to emerge towards the end of 
2002 were more region-specific with the emerging European countries receiving relatively 
more inflows than other emerging market regions. This was reversed in the fourth quarter of 
2008 (due to the global financial crisis) where all four regions experienced significant net 
outflows (a total of US$282 billion or -10%) and this was concentrated in the Asia Pacific 
region (US$159 billion or -18%). In order to investigate the potential of rating spillover 
effects in cross-border bank flows, we model this as in equation (2) below. 
 
𝐺7𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑖,𝑡𝑗= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ ∆𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∙ ∆𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1                                              + 𝛽3 ∙ ∆𝐶𝑅_𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟_1𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 ∙ ∆𝐶𝑅_𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟_2𝑡−1                      + 𝛽5 ∙ ∆𝐶𝑅_𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟_3𝑡−1  + 𝛽6 ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙_𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡  
(2) 
 
The dependent variable, j tkBankFlowsG ,7 , is the quarterly bank flows of each of G7 
country (j)’s banks to a regional (AP, LA, AME and EE) group of target countries (i). G7 
bank flows to individual countries in a region are firstly explained by the target’s own last 
quarter change in long-term credit ratings (ΔCRi,t-1) and outlooks (ΔOutlooki,t-1). We 
implement separate spillover estimations for foreign currency and local currency credit ratings 
and outlooks. Secondly, for each regional group we investigate the spillover effects of 
changes in the other three regions’ comprehensive (aggregate) ratings (long-term credit rating 
adjusted for outlooks) with the variables, ΔCR_Spillover_1, ΔCR_Spillover_2 and 
ΔCR_Spillover_3. The three spillover variables are different for each of the four regional 
17 
 
group estimations. Thirdly, we use the first principal component of all the control variables 
that are used in equation (1) (Principal_Component) to avoid model misspecification errors 
whilst keeping our spillover regressions parsimonious and the reporting of results 
manageable. Unlike Gande and Parsley (2005) whose focus is to investigate the impact of 
ratings events of one country on the sovereign credit spreads of others via an event study 
methodology, we focus on the longer term impact of ratings spillover effects on banking 
flows using a quarterly data frequency. 
A negative coefficient for the spillover variables (ΔCR_Spillover_1, ΔCR_Spillover_2 
and ΔCR_Spillover_3) would suggest the bank flows into one region are crowding out the 
flows into others. That is, an improvement in the ratings of one region would increase the G7 
bank flows into that region at the expense of the others. On the other hand, a positive 
coefficient indicates that a rating improvement in one region leads to more bank lending not 
only to that region itself but also to other emerging market regions. This is the case if the bank 
flows into one region might be part of an overall trend of the international bank flows to all 
emerging market countries.      
 
IV. Empirical Results 
 Effects of Ratings Information on Bank Flows to Emerging Markets 
The full sample results for the overall bank flows model (Eq. 1) are shown in Table 1.9 
The main variables of interest in this study – the rating and outlook variables ( , 1i tCR −∆  and 
, 1i tOutlook −∆ ) – have the expected positive sign in all G7 country estimations except for the 
UK where ratings information are negative but insignificant. Ratings information also does 
not seem to significantly affect bank lending from Canada to emerging markets. Thus there is 
                                                 
9 We also conduct robustness estimations where contemporaneous ratings changes are used instead of lags and 
the first principal component of the economic controls is used instead of using them individually. The ratings 
and outlook coefficients resulting from these estimations are qualitatively the same as what we report in this 
article. For the sake of brevity we are not reporting these robustness estimation results. 
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sufficient evidence to suggest that improvements in sovereign credit ratings in both local- and 
foreign-currency-denominated borrowings help to encourage international bank flows from 
developed to emerging market economies. Rating assessments are particularly important for 
international lending from bank-based systems (France, Germany, Italy and Japan) compared 
to market based ones (US only). Whilst rating assessments on local-currency-denominated 
sovereign debt are slightly less significant than those on foreign-currency-denominated debt 
that are statistically significant at the 1% level for lending from France, Germany and the US 
and 5% for Japan and 10% for Italy, both types of ratings have strong economic significance. 
A single notch improvement in foreign (local) currency credit ratings can increase bank 
financing to emerging markets in the subsequent quarter to the tune of US$470 (307) million 
from France, US$720 (308)  million from Germany, US$184 (165) million from Italy, 
US$812 (823) million from Japan and US$901 (568) million from the US respectively.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
The coefficients for the outlook changes are positive in all cases except for Italy but 
outlook and credit watch guidance have only incremental informational value over ratings for 
German and the U.S. banks. This is not surprising given that outlooks provide short term 
guidance on imminent rating changes over the next few months meaning that outlook 
revisions in the last quarter would have little informational value for lending decisions in the 
current quarter as it would be clear by then whether the outlook alert materialized into an 
actual rating change or not. Interestingly, the size of outlook coefficients are much larger 
compared to those for ratings suggesting that the economic effects of short-term ratings 
information is much greater (US$2.6 and US$2.2 billion respectively for foreign and local 
currency outlooks for German banks, and for the U.S. banks US$3.5 and US$3.4 billion, 
respectively). Importantly, the significance of ratings information remained strong even after 
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controlling for various sources of bilateral linkages, extent of economic and financial 
development and openness and governance quality.   
In our full sample results, we do not find that strong bilateral linkages necessarily 
promote institutional lending to all emerging markets. Whilst political and some cultural ties 
significantly encourage G7 banks to lend to emerging markets, geographical and trade links 
do not. First, we find mixed influence of geographical distance in international bank flows to 
emerging markets. It is only for Germany, that we find a significant negative link which is 
consistent with the cross-border financial flow literature (Portes and Rey 2005; Buch 2005). 
In other cases we find a positive relationship for Canada, France, Japan and the U.S. 
suggesting that bank lenders in these technologically advanced countries are not overly 
concerned with geographical proximity to all their borrowers. We hazard a guess that the 
banks from these countries may have concentrated on servicing their respective country’s 
multinational clients in target emerging markets, and hence, distance may not have been a 
factor in their lending decisions.  
Also in contrast to the existing evidence showing that closer trading ties promote 
cross-border financial flows, we also find a pervasive negative relationship between total 
trade and bank flows suggesting that trade activities may effectively provide non-bank 
sources of funds to emerging markets allowing them to be less reliant on international bank 
financing.  
We contribute a new dimension to the international portfolio choice literature on the 
importance of bilateral political ties to international banking decisions. The estimated 
coefficients on DON are positive and significant for five of the G7 countries with the two 
exceptions being Italy and Japan with significantly negative coefficients. This result suggests 
that there may be implicit top down influences from a G7 government to its own banks to 
help out politically preferred emerging markets. This adds new international evidence to the 
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literature documenting preferential access to financing from political connections within 
national financial systems (see, Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell 2006). 
As for cultural and legal connections, the results are mixed for our full sample. 
Nonetheless, the result on shared membership in the European Union (EU) is stark. Whilst 
France, Germany and Italy exhibit strong lending preferences for emerging European markets 
that are also in the EU, UK banks tend to reduce their lending to these borrowers consistent 
with their overall stance on the ideals, practicalities and ultimately future success of European 
integration.   
In general, the impacts of the economic control variables are by and large intuitive 
though not necessarily expected. We find that more G7 bank flows gravitate towards smaller 
economies (as measured by log GDP) and more efficient banking sectors (higher liquid asset 
ratios and lower interest rate spreads). This is potentially due to a substitution effect in 
banking and equity financing. The results reveal that larger (SMCAP) stock markets in more 
developed emerging market borrowers mostly discourage bank flows from G7 banks. 
Intuitively, emerging markets with larger and more developed stock markets would be less 
reliant on international bank financing. However, emerging countries with better performing 
(RSINDEXCH) stock markets (and overall economic development) attract more international 
banking flows. There are also some mixed signs on BANKCRED as it may be the case that 
emerging markets with more developed domestic banking sectors would be less reliant on 
international bank flows from abroad to satisfy local financing demands. Moreover, the 
relatively high correlation of 0.53 between BANKCRED and SMCAP suggests that emerging 
countries with larger domestic banking sectors are also equipped with more developed stock 
markets that can further alleviate the need for international bank financing.   
On measures of financial openness, we also find evidence of other forms of 
international capital flows crowding out G7 bank lending as shown by significantly negative 
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influences of both FDI and to a lesser extent debt and equity portfolio inflows (PORTFOLIO).  
Whilst significant, direct and financial investment restrictions (DBARR and FBARR) in 
target emerging markets do not pose a major hindrance on G7 lending to these destinations on 
average. In fact, our results suggest that investment restrictions on direct investments and 
financial credits work to increase demands for international bank financing as the alternative 
sources of funding are clamped down. As for the foreign exchange controls, in 5 out of 7 
cases, the coefficient for FXREGM is negative which suggests that the more severe the 
control is the lower is the incoming bank flow. The negative coefficient is significant for 
France, Japan and the UK. However, a significant and positive coefficient is found for Italy 
and the U.S. This suggests that overall the Italian and the U.S. banks prefer the monetary 
policy discipline that tighter exchange controls bring in target borrower countries. 
Lastly, we find that international bank flows are fairly sensitive to the governance and 
institutional environment in emerging markets. The composite governance index had a mixed 
influence on international bank flows. The positive coefficients for France and UK lending 
suggests that banks in these countries place great importance on overall governance quality 
and they are more inclined to increase their lending to better governed emerging markets. 
However, for other G7 countries the overall governance quality of emerging markets was 
either insignificant or inversely related to their bank lending. This may suggest that an 
improvement in the aggregate governance index reduces emerging markets’ reliance on 
international bank financing as alternative forms of international financial flows become more 
accessible as investor protection improves. Alternatively, as Bae and Goyal (2009) find that 
banks on average charge higher loan spreads in countries with lower legal rights and 
enforcement, banks in some G7 countries may in practice have a profit motive to reduce their 




Investment-Grade Vs. Non-Investment-Grade Rating Effects 
 We next check for potential differences in the effect of sovereign credit ratings as well 
as other determinants on international bank flows going towards investment-grade versus 
speculative-grade borrowers in emerging markets. Given some financial institutions may have 
an incentive if not a mandate to avoid lending activities in the non-investment grade spectrum, 
it is important to test for demarcation effects in the relationship between sovereign ratings and 
international bank lending.  
A comparison of results for bank flows entering into investment- and non-investment-
grade destinations is provided in Table 2. We summarize three salient points of the 
estimations. First, we observe that sovereign ratings on foreign-currency-denominated debt 
are generally more significant for the G7 banks’ lending to investment-grade borrowers 
whereas ratings on local-currency-denominated debt play a greater role in non-investment-
grade lending. However, in both cases, outlook revisions are less important than actual rating 
changes consistent with the full sample results discussed above. The sub-sample results for 
different investment grades is illuminating as it suggests that lenders from developed markets 
base their lending decisions on different types of ratings information depending on the 
investment grade of the country to which they are lending. In the investment-grade spectrum, 
lenders look to ratings on foreign  currency debt as their primary concern is with the 
borrower’s ability to repay and service their debt in hard currency whereas at the speculative 
end, the borrower’s fundamental ability to fulfill their debt obligations is more of the concern 
for international bank lenders and so they instead focus on local currency debt ratings to 
monitor local economic and political developments that would impact on the credit risks. This 
substantiates the usefulness of the broad range of sovereign ratings information provided by 
credit rating agencies such as S&P.  
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
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As with the full sample estimation results, in Table 2, we also find other significant 
determinants for international bank flows. However, what is striking is that there is consistent 
evidence on the differential importance of our prior set of determinants conditional on the 
creditworthiness of target countries. 
Firstly, we reveal a greater importance of bilateral linkages for non-investment-grade 
lending as the coefficient on DIST is negative and significant for bank flows from Germany, 
Italy, Japan and UK. The cultural and legal origin linkages are also particularly important for 
speculative grade lending as the shared ENG and CMLW dummy variables are only 
significant and positive for Canada, UK and the US’s non-investment-grade lending. EU 
members from emerging Europe are preferred by banks in developed European countries but 
this preference is strongest for their lending to non-investment-grade markets. We also find 
that UK banks actually have a strong preference for non-investment-grade emerging European 
markets but are less inclined to lend to the investment-grade ones. The importance of cultural 
linkages in international lending decisions corroborates with Giannetti and Yafeh’s (2010) 
results suggesting that culturally distant borrowers receive smaller loans at higher interest 
rates in the syndicated loan market. A shared CIVLW legal origin continues to be preferred 
by historically bank-centric Japan and Germany. Hence, whilst legal origin is clearly 
important, we cannot say whether common law which is based on intricate precedents and 
judges’ discretion is any more effective for international banking than civil law as bank 
orientated systems are traditionally rooted in civil legal origins (La Porta et al. 1997). Political 
ties represented by aid donations (DON) remain important for both investment grades. Taken 
together, our results suggest that geographical proximity and cultural and legal linkages are 
only important for ameliorating informational asymmetries for more risky lending decisions 
to borrowers from non-investment-grade countries. This suggests that familiarity (reduced 
informational asymmetries) are particularly pertinent in swaying bank flows from rich to the 
24 
 
lesser developed (lower rated) nations. This is a crucial finding for the literature and validates 
the apparent insignificance of bilateral linkage variables in our full sample results. 
For the remaining economic and financial control variables, there are also differential 
responses for investment- and non-investment-grade flows. In terms of financial and 
economic development, economic (LGDP) and equity market (SMCAP) size exerts the 
expected pulling power in non-investment-grade lending in contrast to our full sample results 
(highly significant and positive for Germany, Italy, Japan, France and UK bank flows). Stock 
market performance (RSINDEXCH) is positively associated with investment-grade lending as 
these markets are typically the destinations with more developed and thriving financial 
markets. Consistent with this, the crowding out effect of stock market capitalization (SMCAP) 
for the bank flows is concentrated in investment-grade countries (suggesting intuitively that 
the crowding out effect is strongest in the latter stages of financial market development),  In 
all other cases, the effects of the variables hold across both investment grades. The distinction 
in the influence of financial openness on international bank flows based on investment grade 
is also illuminating.  Greater FDI flows to non-investment-grade markets actually work to 
encourage international lending from CAN and the U.S. and the negative influence of the FDI 
flows is mainly concentrated in investment-grade countries and significant for the flows from 
Germany and Japan. This suggests that financial openness is particularly important for 
stimulating international bank flows to destinations that are perceived to be more risky. This 
is also consistent with Rajan and Zingales (2003) theory that financial openness works to 
promote financial development by reducing the influence of interest groups in developing 
economies. As emerging economies become more open and financially developed, they have 
greater demands for international bank financing. In investment-grade emerging markets, 
multinational firms are more confident in making long term foreign direct investments and 
this source of foreign funding takes over the reliance on bank financing. Corroborating with 
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this view, direct investment barriers (DBARR) reduce Italian and US bank flows to only 
investment-grade markets. Except for Italy and Japan, the coefficient for FXREGM is 
negative (and significant for Canada, France, Germany and the U.K.) for the investment-grade 
countries and positive (and significant for France, the U.K. and the U.S.) for the non-
investment-grade countries. This clearly suggests that the G7 banks in general prefer 
exchange rate flexibility for the investment grade borrowers while they value the monetary 
policy discipline that is associated with exchange rate controls in non-investment grade 
countries. The Italian banks prefer exchange rate controls for both types of borrower countries 
whereas the Japanese banks prefer floating rate regimes for both. 
Lastly, we also find markedly consistent evidence on the differential importance of 
governance quality conditional on the creditworthiness of target countries. In comparing the 
results in Tables 1 and 2, we note that the overall estimation results are determined primarily 
by the non-investment-grade sub-group despite a fairly even number of observations in both 
grades of emerging markets. In the breakdown by investment grade, we find that governance 
and institutional quality is in fact important for investment-grade lending (from France and 
UK) but not for speculative-grade. The estimated coefficients on GOV for non-investment-
grade estimations are all negative and significant (except for Germany).This suggests that 
improvements in the aggregate governance quality of a lower rated country enables them to 
become less reliant on international bank financing as alternative forms of international 
capital flows become more accessible when investor protection visibly improves. As loan 
conditions are typically poorer for speculative-grade borrowers, they are more inclined to 
access alternative forms of financing when they can. Our differential findings for cultural and 
legal linkages in addition to the importance of governance quality in non-investment-grade 
borrowers is consistent with Stulz and Williamson’s (2003) revelation that cultural differences 
around the world reflect how well investor protection and creditor rights can be enforced. If 
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there is little cultural similarity with a low grade country to begin with, then governance 
quality becomes a secondary concern. Moreover, given that Bae and Goyal (2009) find banks 
receive higher loan spreads in countries with lower legal rights and enforcement, it is 
plausible that more aggressive banks in some G7 countries may opt to reduce their lending to 
emerging markets with improving governance but lowering interest spreads.  
 
Regional Rating Spillover Effects on Emerging Market Bank Flows 
We next turn to a regional analysis on the effect of emerging market sovereign rating 
revisions and their inter-regional spillover effects. The results on foreign currency rating 
spillover effects are first presented in Table 3.  
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
For the foreign currency rating spillover estimations,  the impacts of own country 
ratings and outlook changes are subsumed by spillover effects from all other regions’ ratings 
changes (with the exception of Emerging Europe’s rating spillovers). The comprehensive 
credit rating spillover variables are both statistically and economically more significant than 
own country rating and outlook revisions as a one notch improvement in other regions’ 
average ratings can move banking flows by ten folds or more than own country rating effects 
(based on the size of estimated coefficients). The highly significant principal component 
variable indicates that other relevant determinants for international bank flows are adequately 
controlled for in our rating spillover estimations.  
Closer examination of the spillover coefficients for the four emerging market regions 
reveals a number of interesting patterns. First, negative spillovers from other emerging 
regions are widespread throughout emerging markets. That is, bank flows to individual 
emerging markets contract in response to improvements in credit assessments of other 
emerging regions. This implies that emerging market sovereign ratings have competitive 
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(“crowding out”) effects on international bank flows as G7 lenders are drawn by rating 
improvements first at the aggregate regional level then the country level.  The competitive 
effects may be due to relatively fixed loan portfolio allocations that banks in developed 
markets set for emerging markets in aggregate. Hence, as economic and political 
improvements (as indicated by rating/outlook upgrades) occur in one region, loanable funds 
are shifted away from other emerging markets in pursuit of the best risk-adjusted returns for 
bank shareholders.  Alternatively the negative spillovers might be due to a lack of investment 
opportunities in the affected regions. That is, ratings improvements in one region draws 
loanable funds from other regions with insufficient investment potential.  
Rating spillovers from the AP are a standout as they are consistently positive for 
countries in other emerging regions. This suggests that fundamental credit condition 
improvements in AP countries have largely complementary spillover effects for all emerging 
markets’ access to international bank financing. In addition, the AP is the most important 
emerging market region in terms of attracting the most international bank flows. The average 
net claim of the G7 banks against AP countries over the sample period is US$55 trillion 
whereas the overall average for all four regions is US$22 trillion.10 Therefore, it can be 
argued that when the G7 banks decide to increase their exposure to emerging markets, they 
explore the AP first and then the other regions which would explain the unambiguous positive 
ratings spillovers from the AP. However, once portfolio allocations to emerging markets are 
strategically increased, the G7 banks then selectively choose to focus on other regions with 
rating improvements at the expense of AP borrowers. For this reason, rating spillovers to AP 
from other regions are all negative. 
                                                 
10 The overall average claims of G7 banks on the other three emerging market regions are US$8.1 (LA), 
US$15.1 (AME) and US$14 trillion (EE) for the full sample from 1995-2008.  
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Lastly, we note that the bank flows to LA and AME countries are mostly dependent on 
each other’s regional rating events (not AP or EE). Credit improvements in these two regions 
are highly competitive for international bank flows. 
Local currency rating spillover effects are shown in Table 4. The spillover effects are 
noticeably less pronounced compared to the foreign currency spillovers (especially those of 
EE) but the direction of regional rating spillovers remain largely the same. Whilst negative 
ratings spillover from LA and AME remains significant and negative in nearly all cases, the 
spillovers from EE exert next to no impact on bank flows to other emerging countries. The 
positive rating spillovers from AP also remain, corroborating the importance of Asian 
sovereign ratings in attracting international bank flows for all emerging markets over our 
sample period.    
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
To explore potential time variations in rating spillover effects on international bank 
flows, we report in Table 5 our sub-sample results. We break the sample at the end of 2003 as 
there is a significant and noticeable structural break in international bank flows to emerging 
markets in 2003. Bank inflows to the emerging market regions collapsed in the last quarter of 
1997 (coinciding with the Asian Financial Crisis) and remained at low levels before picking 
up in 2003. This prolonged period of depressed bank flows is most likely due to the various 
emerging market crises that took place from 1997-98 (Asian and Russian crises) to the end of 
the Argentine crisis. Hence, the two sub-samples reveal marked changes in the patterns of 
rating spillovers. The spillover coefficients from AP and EE are positive in the first sample 
and negative or insignificant in the second in all cases whilst spillover from LA and AME 
remained negative throughout both sub-sample periods.11 Positive spillovers in the earlier 
sub-sample period that was dominated by various financial crises is largely consistent with 
                                                 
11 This result is robust to an exclusion of the last quarter of 2008, after Lehman Brother’s collapse. 
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Van Rijckeghem and Weder’s (2003) finding that banks withdraw from even non-crisis hit 
countries when they suffer losses in some other markets during financial crises. This change 
in the direction of rating spillovers can be interpreted in two ways. First, it could be that rating 
events in AP and EE initially acted as a conduit for the G7 banks to increase their exposure to 
the emerging markets as a whole. Then, once the G7 lenders re-entered the emerging markets, 
the bank flows to each of the emerging market regions crowded each other out. 12 
Alternatively, rating declines for AP and EE countries during the Asian and Russian financial 
crises worked to decrease bank flows to all emerging markets, but subsequent improvements 
in credit conditions (in the second subsample) pulled bank flows back to AP countries at the 
expense of others.  
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
In sum, we document the important roles that sovereign ratings play in determining 
the G7’s bank lending flows to emerging markets. International bank flows are influenced not 
only by the sovereign ratings and outlooks of the recipient countries but also by the average 
ratings of other emerging market regions. Whilst there is a strong positive relationship 
between own country ratings and outlooks with incoming bank flows, spillover influences of 
other emerging market regions’ foreign currency debt ratings are also strongly present.  
 
V. Conclusions 
We investigate the influence of different types of sovereign credit rating information 
on variations in international bank flows to emerging market economies. Specifically, we find 
G7 bank flows are influenced by various measures of credit quality for target destinations. 
Firstly, we find evidence indicating that sovereign credit rating and outlooks have strong 
positive effects on international bank flows from developed markets to emerging market 
                                                 
12 The subsample analyses for local currency ratings spillovers show similar but weaker results. We do not report 
these results for brevity but they are available upon request. 
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borrowers even after controlling for a host of bilateral linkages and other determinants. 
Secondly, our sub-sample evidence suggests that foreign currency ratings information are 
more influential for bank lending to investment-grade borrowers, whilst lending decisions to 
non-investment-grade countries are swayed more by local currency rating assessments. 
Thirdly, we find that informational asymmetries are only of concern in international bank 
lending to more risky non-investment-grade destinations as international lenders have a clear 
preference for choosing more familiar emerging market targets that share their own cultural 
and legal backgrounds. However, they also show higher risk appetite for taking credit 
positions against non-investment-grade countries with lower governance quality and tighter 
foreign exchange controls. 
Finally, we report significant rating spillover effects. For the full sample, we find 
generally negative spillover effects where ratings improvements in one region pulls the bank 
flows away from the others. Yet, we find a complementary influence of Asian rating events 
on the bank flows to all emerging market bank flows. In sub-sample analyses, we find that the 
positive spillover effects are concentrated in the earlier sub-sample pre-2003.  In contrast, 
since 2003 ratings improvements in the Asian and European regions have effectively reduced 
the bank flows heading to the other regions. Taken together, sovereign credit ratings have 
unequivocal informational value for international bank lending decisions.  
From a policy perspective, these findings imply that emerging market governments 
can play a vital role for banking liquidity and economic development and should cooperate 
with rating agencies in the consistent provision of relevant and timely information for the on-
going country rating process. The independence of rating agencies is critical for international 
banking regulatory guidelines to remain effective as credit rating agencies do appear to play a 
role in ameliorating the monitoring costs in international bank lending activities.  
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Our study is not without its limitations. As we do not capture off-balance sheet 
positions of the G7 banks in emerging markets, it is likely that our results understate the 
importance of sovereign ratings on international banking activities. Yet our consistently 
robust results in this study suggest that a significant influence of ratings information on 
international bank flows cannot be denied. Moreover, although we have only explored the 
influence of agency credit ratings in the context of ”pull” factors in emerging markets, we are 
aware that push factors in G7 economies themselves may well have also affected international 
bank flows. However, for most of the sample period, growth in the developed world has been 
strong and international bank flows have been largely pro-cyclical. Thus, we leave the 
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Appendix B  
TABLE B1. Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
Variables Descriptions Data Sources
G-7 BankFlows Quarterly change in G-7 banks’ end-year foreign claims against each of the 55 
emerging market countries, in US$ billions.
BIS's consolidated banking statistics, 
Table 9B: Consolidated foreign claims of reporting banks - immediate 
borrower basis (http://www.bis.org/statistics/consstats.htm)
Sovereign credit ratings Standard & Poor's
Credit Rating_FCurrency Foreign currency sovereign long-term credit rating
Outlook_FCurrency Foreign currency outlook of long-term sovereign rating
Credit Rating_LCurrency Local currency sovereign long-term credit rating
Outlook_LCurrency Local currency outlook of long-term sovereign rating
Bilateral Linkage
Distance (DIST) Natural log of distance between capital cities of the target and donor country pairs 
in kilometers
Calculated from coordinates of capital cities obtained from CIA's world 
factbook:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
Total Trade (TOTTRADE) Sum of export and import between the target and donor country pairs in natural 
logs, US$
IMF's direction of trade statistics:
http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/collections/stats/dot/
Donation Flows (DON) Official aid flows from each G7 to emerging country, in US$ millions, natural logs World Bank development indicators CD-ROM, 2009
English Language link (ENG) Dummy variable = 1 if donor/target country pair shares English as an official or 
   
CIA's world factbook
European Union (EU) Dummy variable = 1 if donor/target country pair shares European Union 
  
http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/index_en.htm
Common Law (CMLW) Dummy variable = 1 if donor/target country pair shares a commonlaw legal origin, 
 
La Porta et al. (1997)
Civil Law (CIVLW) Dummy variable = 1 if donor/target country pair shares a civil law legal origin, =0 La Porta et al. (1997)
Economic and Financial Development World Bank development indicators CD-ROM, 2009
GDP (LGDP) GDP in natural logs, US$
Stock Market Capitalization (SMCAP) Market capitalization of listed companies at the end of year in natural logs, US$
Banks Credit Extended (BANKCRED) Domestic credit provided by banking sector in natural logs, US$
Interest Rate Spread (INTSPREAD) Difference between lending and deposit rates in percentage points
Bank Liquid Reserves to Asset Ratio 
(LIQTOASSET)
Ratio of liquid assets to total assets
Financial Openness
FDI on BOP basis (FDI) FDI inflows in natural logs, US$ World Bank development indicators CD-ROM, 2009
Total Portfolio inflow (PORTFOLIO) Sum of bond and equity portfolio investment inflows in natural logs, US$
Domestic Barriers to Investments (DBARR) Investment restrictions on direct investment IMF's annual reports on exchange arrangements and restrictions 1995-2007
Foreign Barriers to Investments (FBARR) Investment restrictions on financial credit IMF's annual reports on exchange arrangements and restrictions 1995-2007
Foreign Exchange Regime (FXREGM) 4 = Dollarization, 3 = Curreny board, 2 = Currency pegs, 1 = Crawling pegs, 
0 = Floating
IMF's Classification of Exchange Rate Arrangements and Monetary 
Frameworks, http://www.imf.org/external/np/mfd/er/index.asp
IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, 
Various issues.
Governance and Institutional Quality
World Bank Governance indicators 
- Composite measure (Gov)
Aggregate of individual governance measure - Accountability, Political stability, 
Governance effectiveness, Regulation quality, Rule of Law and Corruption - each 
ranges from -2.5 to 2.5
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TABLE 1. Overall Foreign and Local Currency Rating Estimations: 1995-2008. 
 
Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK US
Panel A. Foreign Currency Ratings and Outlooks
∆CR 0.0343 0.4703*** 0.72*** 0.1836* 0.8118** -0.2905 0.9009***
{.4596} {.0000} {.0000} {.0859} {.0305} {.4138} {.0039} 
∆Outlook 0.3156 1.0646 2.6303** -0.2353 1.7332 2.18 3.5394*
{.2680} {.1162} {.0152} {.7246} {.4581} {.2971} {.0753} 
Panel B. Local Currency Ratings and Outlooks
∆CR 0.0034 0.3071*** 0.3086* 0.1652 0.8234** -0.4917 0.5675*
{.9426} {.0071} {.0842} {.1717} {.0324} {.2088} {.0845} 
∆Outlook 0.2919 0.8832 2.2439** -0.2452 1.5541 2.1552 3.3828*
{.3039} {.1922} {.0381} {.7149} {.5047} {.3013} {.0908} 
Panel C. Bilateral Linkage
DIST 0.4108*** 0.3987*** -0.4527** 0.1298 4.46*** -0.0141 6.9691***
{.0000} {.0009} {.0180} {.2642} {.0000} {.9708} {.0000} 
TOTTRADE -0.1163*** -1.3693*** -2.685*** -0.4861*** -0.7685*** -2.1111*** -1.4711***
{.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} 
DON 0.1009*** 0.3107*** 0.529*** -0.0584** -0.2723*** 0.4123*** 1.0634***
{.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0162} {.0061} {.0000} {.0000} 
ENG -0.2866*** -5.4493*** 0.6139
{.0008} {.0000} {.2563} 
EU 1.9999*** 3.0713*** 0.8796*** -1.3077**
{.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0417} 
CMLW 0.5034*** -4.9609*** 4.3628***
{.0000} {.0000} {.0000} 
CIVLW -0.0655 1.662*** -0.2729** 1.6941***
{.5945} {.0000} {.0255} {.0001} 
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 Note: This table presents the overall results for the panel data specifications shown below: 
𝐺7𝐵𝑎𝑛𝐹𝑙 𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑖,𝑡𝑗 =
𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ ∆𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∙ ∆𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 ∙ 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙_𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑠𝑖,𝑡𝑘𝑝𝑘=3 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 ∙ 𝐹𝑖𝑛_𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑚𝑡𝑖,𝑡𝑘𝑞𝑘=10 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 ∙ 𝐹𝑖𝑛_𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑡𝑘𝑟𝑘=16 + 𝛽20 ∙ 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡  (1) 
Where G7BankFlows are the quarterly changes in foreign claims of G7 countries’ banks against 55 emerging market countries. CR and 
Outlook are sovereign credit ratings and outlooks of the emerging market countries for foreign- and local-currency-denominated debt. 
The control variables incorporate country-specific variables. Numbers in braces are p-values. 
***Significant at the 1% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
*Significant at the 10% level. 
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TABLE 1. – Continued 
 
Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK US
Panel D. Economic and Financial Development
LGDP -0.1963*** -0.1208** 0.2315** 0.0247 -1.5059*** 0.2195 -3.0994***
{.0000} {.0420} {.0204} {.6869} {.0000} {.2125} {.0000} 
SMCAP -0.0032*** -0.0149*** -0.0102*** 0.0069*** -0.0405*** -0.0655*** -0.014***
{.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0002} 
BANKCRED 0.0001 -0.0021 0.008*** 0.0033** -0.0131*** -0.0195*** -0.0063
{.8799} {.1467} {.0005} {.0133} {.0062} {.0000} {.1786} 
INTSPREAD -0.0023 -0.0111*** -0.0475*** -0.0239*** 0.0061 -0.0337*** -0.035***
{.1714} {.0003} {.0000} {.0000} {.5654} {.0003} {.0029} 
LIQTOASSET 0.0065*** 0.013** 0.0496*** 0.0216*** 0.0481** 0.0366** 0.127***
{.0088} {.0208} {.0000} {.0002} {.0277} {.0410} {.0000} 
RSINDEXCH 0.4324** 1.0527*** 1.043 0.23 2.6733 4.0397*** 1.1499*
{.0399} {.0032} {.2147} {.5880} {.1241} {.0030} {.0523} 
Panel E. Financial Openness
FDI 0.0055 -0.0369*** -0.0415 -0.042*** -0.3129*** 0.0528 0.0063
{.4057} {.0089} {.1087} {.0076} {.0000} {.2837} {.8902} 
PORTFOLIO -0.0001*** -0.0003*** -0.0006*** -0.0002*** -0.0009*** -0.0017*** -0.0011***
{.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} 
DBARR -0.1161** 0.0704 0.8835*** 0.3255*** 2.448*** 0.5796 -0.8373**
{.0213} {.5454} {.0000} {.0073} {.0000} {.1268} {.0216} 
FBARR 0.1347** 0.8577*** 1.4332*** 0.3425** 5.2911*** 2.6839*** 1.005**
{.0130} {.0000} {.0000} {.0110} {.0000} {.0000} {.0104} 
FXREGM -0.0189 -0.1884*** -0.016 0.1597*** -1.2969*** -0.6565*** 0.3179**
{.2995} {.0000} {.8190} {.0003} {.0000} {.0000} {.0183} 
Panel F. Governance and Institutional Quality
Gov -0.0126 0.0809*** 0.0155 -0.0998*** -0.0771 0.4313*** -0.0326
{.1253} {.0000} {.6712} {.0000} {.2329} {.0000} {.5797} 
Likelihood -3134 -4871 -5790 -3034 -7102 -6444 -7552 




TABLE 2. Investment- and Non-investment-grade Estimations 
  
INV Non_INV INV Non_INV INV Non_INV INV Non_INV INV Non_INV INV Non_INV INV Non_INV
Panel A. Foreign Currency Ratings and Outlooks
∆CR 0.1404 -0.0053 0.8544*** 0.3411*** 1.1554*** 0.4497*** 0.3476 0.1386 1.3204 0.5368*** -2.5102*** 0.0151 1.1763 0.3937**
{.2729} {.7966} {.0014} {.0000} {.0010} {.0073} {.1503} {.1387} {.2540} {.0000} {.0081} {.9101} {.1277} {.0491} 
∆Outlook 0.9763 0.0298 2.4583* 0.0791 5.3104*** 0.7072 -1.0947 0.4048 3.6798 0.9161 0.0456 0.4184 4.2787 1.2818
{.1041} {.8324} {.0561} {.8801} {.0014} {.5440} {.3882} {.5215} {.4177} {.3113} {.9904} {.6457} {.2519} {.3546} 
Panel B. Local Curreny Ratings and Outlooks
∆CR 0.0008 0.0021 0.4216 0.2545*** 0.9157** -0.0159 0.3955 0.0512 -0.1439 0.6788*** -3.9232*** 0.0395 -0.1333 0.5**
{.9953} {.9205} {.1539} {.0011} {.0197} {.9232} {.1388} {.6327} {.9052} {.0000} {.0001} {.7910} {.8750} {.0136} 
∆Outlook 0.7659 0.0321 1.4114 0.1187 4.2054*** 0.5714 -1.3301 0.3852 2.0383 1.0135 1.7491 0.4331 2.5267 1.3866
{.1837} {.8200} {.2541} {.8218} {.0088} {.6252} {.2778} {.5468} {.6401} {.2614} {.6281} {.6349} {.4839} {.3170} 
Panel C. Bilateral Linkage
DIST 1.0102*** 0.0503 1.2059*** 0.1709 1.561*** -4.3309*** 0.6942*** -0.3928** 7.9547*** -1.5583*** 2.7011*** -1.3173*** 11.0709*** 3.7344***
{.0000} {.3043} {.0000} {.2758} {.0000} {.0000} {.0001} {.0169} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} 
TOTTRADE -0.0649 -0.1173*** -1.5637*** -1.1136*** -1.6401*** -4.8685*** -0.0738 -0.8369*** 0.1865 -2.3939*** -2.333*** -1.5474*** -1.6097*** -0.9579***
{.1425} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.5791} {.0000} {.4504} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} 
DON 0.1272*** 0.0834*** 0.5285*** 0.4096*** 0.5916*** -0.1583 0.0106 -0.0429 -0.1661 -0.0781 0.6307*** 0.195*** 1.3145*** 1.4211***
{.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.1045} {.7723} {.2063} {.3302} {.1001} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} 
ENG -0.8805*** 0.3027*** -11.3948*** 2.9823*** -2.9694*** 3.0011***
{.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0012} {.0000} 
EU 1.8781*** 1.5122*** 3.2507*** 4.0525*** 0.3804 1.9485*** -1.086 1.2777***
{.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.1661} {.0000} {.2811} {.0009} 
CMLW 0.5794*** 0.6272*** -0.1264 0.7041 3.7351*** 0.1095
{.0002} {.0000} {.8984} {.2582} {.0002} {.8474} 
CIVLW -1.474*** -0.1638 -0.0554 2.6155*** 0.3481 -0.7291*** -0.0564 1.2222***
{.0000} {.1303} {.8600} {.0000} {.1385} {.0000} {.9444} {.0000} 
UK USCanada France Germany Italy Japan
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Note: This table presents the separate panel estimation results of Eq (1) for two sub-groups of emerging markets – those with investment 
grade ratings (BBB- and above) and those with non-investment ratings (BB+ and below). 
𝐺7𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑖,𝑡𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ ∆𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∙ ∆𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 ∙ 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙_𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑠𝑖,𝑡𝑘𝑝𝑘=3 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 ∙ 𝐹𝑖𝑛_𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑚𝑡𝑖,𝑡𝑘𝑞𝑘=10 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 ∙ 𝐹𝑖𝑛_𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖 ,𝑡𝑘𝑟𝑘=16 + 𝛽20 ∙ 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡  
                (1) 
Where G7BankFlows are the quarterly changes in foreign claims of G7 countries’ banks against the two groups of emerging market 
borrowers. CR and Outlook are sovereign credit ratings and outlooks of the emerging market countries for foreign and local currency debt. 
The control variables incorporate country-specific variables. Numbers in braces are p-values.  
***Significant at the 1% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
*Significant at the 10% level. 
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TABLE 2. – Continued 
 
INV Non_INV INV Non_INV INV Non_INV INV Non_INV INV Non_INV INV Non_INV INV Non_INV
Panel D. Economic and Financial Development
LGDP -0.4157*** -0.0623*** -0.4171*** -0.1493* -0.7466*** 2.5996*** -0.3017*** 0.2701*** -2.968*** 1.0668*** -0.4697* 0.5514*** -4.6681*** -2.2307***
{.0000} {.0032} {.0000} {.0566} {.0000} {.0000} {.0009} {.0012} {.0000} {.0000} {.0757} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} 
SMCAP -0.0067*** 0.0005 -0.0229*** 0.0056*** -0.0133*** 0.0074** -0.0004 0.0121*** -0.0465*** 0.0158*** -0.1236*** 0.0016 -0.019*** -0.018***
{.0000} {.2001} {.0000} {.0016} {.0000} {.0391} {.8460} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.5258} {.0006} {.0000} 
BANKCRED -0.0002 -0.0024*** 0.0028 -0.0155*** -0.0012 -0.0031 0.0082*** -0.0013 -0.0237*** -0.0063** -0.0608*** -0.0077*** 0.0143* -0.0386***
{.8583} {.0000} {.1884} {.0000} {.6713} {.3628} {.0001} {.4548} {.0015} {.0145} {.0000} {.0034} {.0543} {.0000} 
INTSPREAD -0.0368*** -0.0015** -0.0839*** -0.0052** 0.0187 -0.0457*** 0.0038 -0.0242*** -0.1213** -0.0057 -0.3313*** -0.024*** -0.31*** -0.0369***
{.0000} {.0348} {.0000} {.0156} {.3368} {.0000} {.8102} {.0000} {.0298} {.1023} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} 
LIQTOASSET 0.0242*** 0.0074*** 0.0407*** 0.0185*** 0.0742*** 0.0239** 0.0296** 0.0188*** 0.1869*** -0.0064 0.0996** 0.0484*** 0.28*** 0.1141***
{.0001} {.0000} {.0006} {.0001} {.0001} {.0157} {.0417} {.0011} {.0001} {.4782} {.0152} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} 
RSINDEXCH 0.7224* 0.2601** 1.83*** -0.0512 2.643*** -1.8445 0.7141 0.284 7.7486*** -0.2596 6.5992*** 0.2218 0.9915 0.9642
{.0625} {.0349} {.0018} {.8567} {.0066} {.1283} {.3065} {.5747} {.0083} {.6334} {.0071} {.7464} {.4233} {.2512} 
Panel E. Financial Openness
FDI 0.0062 0.0145*** -0.0269 0.0119 -0.0605** -0.0906** -0.0064 -0.076*** -0.3452*** -0.0158 -0.0491 0.0036 0.0567 0.2546***
{.5473} {.0028} {.1488} {.5276} {.0473} {.0230} {.7949} {.0001} {.0000} {.6245} {.4529} {.9109} {.3825} {.0000} 
PORTFOLIO 0.0000 -0.0001*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0012*** 0.0001 -0.0017*** -0.0007*** -0.0009*** -0.0008***
{.1064} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0001} {.0000} {.0000} {.1245} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} 
DBARR -0.1397 0.1463*** -0.2632 -0.0455 -0.1553 1.3601*** -0.4211** 0.1864 3.9001*** -0.0492 1.8389*** 0.1797 -1.0717* 0.8645***
{.1470} {.0000} {.1464} {.7184} {.5592} {.0000} {.0325} {.2140} {.0000} {.8032} {.0021} {.4236} {.0717} {.0026} 
FBARR -0.0181 -0.0701** 0.6059*** 0.0847 4.0039*** -1.1856*** 0.7798*** 0.2363 5.2513*** -0.0399 2.1079*** -0.5406** -0.222 0.3579
{.8773} {.0397} {.0048} {.5053} {.0000} {.0000} {.0011} {.1329} {.0000} {.8446} {.0057} {.0190} {.7541} {.2772} 
FXREGM -0.0805** 0.0134 -0.9682*** 0.1502*** -0.5801*** 0.0662 0.0248 0.3556*** -2.3904*** -0.5136*** -1.9209*** 0.4092*** -0.0863 0.5673***
{.0117} {.2131} {.0000} {.0001} {.0000} {.4390} {.7902} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.6800} {.0000} 
Panel F. Governance and Institutional Quality
Gov -0.0223 -0.0427*** 0.2335*** -0.0725*** -0.029 0.1946*** -0.0263 -0.1903*** -0.2423** -0.2033*** 0.6656*** -0.2748*** 0.0633 -0.4537***
{.1635} {.0000} {.0000} {.0004} {.6021} {.0000} {.5274} {.0000} {.0400} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.5316} {.0000} 
Likelihood -1899 -614 -2809 -1690 -3018 -2556 -1602 -1305 -4092 -2071 -3550 -2216 -4060 -3124 
Nobs 1152 1078 1195 963 1120 986 771 725 1134 926 1036 890 1152 1078
UK USCanada France Germany Italy Japan
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TABLE 3. Foreign Currency Ratings Spillover 
 
Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK US
Panel A. Asia Pacific
∆CR_FC 0.0811 0.0448 0.5814 0.0303 1.609 -0.529 -0.0219
{.3235} {.9281} {.2208} {.6816} {.2150} {.8385} {.9810} 
∆Outlook_FC 0.503 -0.5319 2.9036 0.3455 3.862 -1.5745 -0.6326
{.3604} {.8733} {.3607} {.4858} {.6568} {.9276} {.9183} 
Spillover from Asia Pacific
Spillover from  Latin America -3.3973*** -27.8167*** -31.5102*** -2.8041*** -56.7639*** -99.2615*** -45.674***
{.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} 
Spillover from  Africa and Middle East -0.5945 -8.2903*** -8.9351*** -0.69* -17.2402*** -35.6302*** -18.3745***
{.1249} {.0069} {.0001} {.0758} {.0084} {.0011} {.0012} 
Spillover from Eastern Europe -0.3941 -7.0032*** -3.8133** -0.4897 -5.2152 -22.486** -14.8989***
{.2193} {.0062} {.0381} {.1291} {.3363} {.0124} {.0017} 
Principal Component 0 -0.0003*** 0.0002** 0 0.0008*** -0.0034*** -0.0006***
{.6918} {.0007} {.0330} {.4367} {.0022} {.0000} {.0003} 
Nobs 594 594 594 594 594 594 594 
Panel B. Latin America
∆CR_FC -0.0288 -0.4387 -0.5829 0.0193 -0.3951*** -0.0834 -0.5872
{.3853} {.3676} {.2124} {.7179} {.0092} {.9694} {.1197} 
∆Outlook_FC -0.1066 -0.6398 -0.3596 0.1084 -0.3448 1.6362 -1.3451
{.3791} {.7170} {.8329} {.5783} {.5323} {.8357} {.3313} 
Spillover from Asia Pacific 0.0421 0.3498 0.4557 0.1073** 0.1444 -1.3382 0.255
{.1052} {.4895} {.2611} {.0160} {.3019} {.5473} {.3662} 
Spillover from  Latin America
Spillover from  Africa and Middle East 0.0158 -4.5525*** -5.7312*** -0.3819*** -0.9897*** -5.4778 -3.2368***
{.7887} {.0001} {.0000} {.0002} {.0018} {.2763} {.0000} 
Spillover from Eastern Europe -0.0476 -2.2842** -0.9343 -0.1212 -0.2532 -6.0126 -0.6882
{.3334} {.0169} {.2232} {.1504} {.3381} {.1524} {.1979} 
Principal Component 0.0001*** 0.0004*** 0.0015*** 0*** 0.0006*** 0.0105*** 0.0014***
{.0000} {.0002} {.0000} {.0004} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} 




Note: This table presents the regional rating spillover effects of foreign-currency-denominated sovereign ratings of Eq (2A) below. 
𝐺7𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑖,𝑡𝑗 =
𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ ∆𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∙ ∆𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∙ ∆𝐶𝑅_𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟_1𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 ∙ ∆𝐶𝑅_𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟_2𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 ∙ ∆𝐶𝑅_𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟_3𝑡−1  + 𝛽6 ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙_𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡   
                (2A) 
Where G7BankFlows are the quarterly changes in the foreign claims of G7 countries’ banks against 55 emerging market countries. CR and 
Outlook are sovereign credit ratings and outlooks of the emerging market countries’ debt denominated in foreign currencies. 
ΔCR_Spillover_1, ΔCR_Spillover_2 and ΔCR_Spillover_3 are the average foreign currency rating changes of the other three regions. The 
control variables incorporate country-specific variables. Numbers in braces are p-values.  
***Significant at the 1% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
*Significant at the 10% level. 
44 
 
TABLE 3. – Continued 
  
Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK US
Panel C. Africa and Middle East
∆CR_FC 0.0044 0.2855 -0.0547 -0.1742 -0.16 0.1246 -0.3359
{.6878} {.5659} {.9546} {.7984} {.2047} {.1975} {.2464} 
∆Outlook_FC 0.0073 -0.7558 -0.9563 -3.3698 -0.7261 -0.0624 -0.6198
{.8727} {.7117} {.8099} {.2296} {.1645} {.8764} {.6053} 
Spillover from Asia Pacific 0.0261* -0.1578 -0.128 -0.7682 0.1558 0.128 0.3182
{.0920} {.9201} {.9458} {.7030} {.5089} {.4385} {.5637} 
Spillover from  Latin America -0.0844* -14.2971*** -38.4632*** -17.4406*** -2.4428*** -2.1817*** -8.2545***
{.0766} {.0032} {.0000} {.0050} {.0008} {.0000} {.0000} 
Spillover from  Africa and Middle East
Spillover from Eastern Europe -0.0497 -5.6837* -6.5656* -6.2118 -1.0462** 0.0958 -1.7793
{.1091} {.0728} {.0824} {.1254} {.0272} {.7727} {.1080} 
Principal Component 0*** 0.0004*** 0.003*** 0.0001 0.0002*** 0.0001** 0.0009***
{.0000} {.0037} {.0000} {.5458} {.0000} {.0187} {.0000} 
Nobs 864 864 864 864 864 864 864 
Panel D. Eastern Europe
∆CR_FC -0.032 0.1603 0.3112 0.1125 0.3414* 0.3113 1.0526
{.7498} {.2264} {.1143} {.3846} {.0812} {.2597} {.1898} 
∆Outlook_FC 0.3946 1.6166** 4.387*** 0.6556 5.8429*** 1.8706 11.2057**
{.5008} {.0402} {.0002} {.3854} {.0000} {.2464} {.0204} 
Spillover from Asia Pacific 0.522*** 0.6044*** 0.8644*** 0.4627* 0.4112*** 0.4536 1.5812*
{.0050} {.0003} {.0001} {.0637} {.0026} {.3793} {.0692} 
Spillover from  Latin America -2.1417*** -4.7005*** -9.009*** -4.0515*** -5.3283*** -4.6828*** -21.9978***
{.0002} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0032} {.0000} 
Spillover from  Africa and Middle East -0.7451* -2.0746*** -3.9566*** -1.4427** -2.7036*** -2.5252** -12.9322***
{.0949} {.0000} {.0000} {.0161} {.0000} {.0416} {.0000} 
Spillover from Eastern Europe
Principal Component 0.0002*** 0.0012*** 0.0011*** 0.0004*** 0.0015*** 0.0024*** 0.005***
{.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} 
Nobs 1080 1080 1080 1080 1080 1080 1080 
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TABLE 4. Local Currency Ratings Spillover 
 
 
Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK US
Panel A. Asia Pacific
∆CR_LC 0.1289 0.1986 0.8072 0.0208 2.6273 -0.6875 0.2734
{.2405} {.7675} {.2024} {.8343} {.1296} {.8411} {.8259} 
∆Outlook_LC 0.5841 -1.2246 4.4467 0.3471 1.8998 4.6064 -0.3493
{.3534} {.7436} {.2211} {.5368} {.8473} {.8181} {.9598} 
Spillover from Asia Pacific
Spillover from  Latin America -3.786*** -35.2475*** -36.8745*** -3.191*** -54.7206*** -127.3794*** -63.0746***
{.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0001} {.0001} {.0000} {.0000} 
Spillover from  Africa and Middle East 0.1452 -4.0694 -4.4186 -0.069 -3.049 -29.1391* -13.6591*
{.7954} {.3586} {.1665} {.9023} {.7427} {.0614} {.0965} 
Spillover from Eastern Europe 0.1461 -1.0125 1.9055 -0.0313 3.1634 -1.4982 -4.4627
{.6283} {.6723} {.2683} {.9178} {.5276} {.8582} {.3145} 
Principal Component 0.0000 -0.0003*** 0.0002** 0.0000 0.0007*** -0.0034*** -0.0006***
{.7759} {.0006} {.0494} {.4805} {.0033} {.0000} {.0002} 
Nobs 594 594 594 594 594 594 594 
Panel B. Latin America
∆CR_LC -0.0393 -0.5229 -0.2793 0.1115* -0.572*** -2.401 -0.9073**
{.3296} {.3703} {.6214} {.0844} {.0017} {.3572} {.0489} 
∆Outlook_LC 0.0426 0.0112 0.7527 0.3002 -0.1495 -0.1791 -0.7881
{.7669} {.9957} {.7093} {.1929} {.8183} {.9847} {.6303} 
Spillover from Asia Pacific 0.0338 0.1208 0.3744 0.1001* 0.1485 -2.0792 0.1829
{.2622} {.8386} {.4294} {.0597} {.3611} {.4217} {.5753} 
Spillover from  Latin America
Spillover from  Africa and Middle East 0.1252 -2.7872 -4.2949*** -0.1459 -0.5934 -3.9417 -2.7074***
{.1461} {.1001} {.0015} {.3368} {.2017} {.5940} {.0037} 
Spillover from Eastern Europe -0.051 -0.6923 0.6663 0.011 -0.0641 -7.0034* 0.1136
{.2635} {.4401} {.3524} {.8910} {.7944} {.0734} {.8180} 
Principal Component 0.0001*** 0.0004*** 0.0016*** 0.0000*** 0.0006*** 0.0105*** 0.0015***
{.0000} {.0001} {.0000} {.0002} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} 
Nobs 432 432 432 432 432 432 432 
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Note: This table presents the regional ratings spillover effects of local-currency-denominated sovereign ratings of Eq (2B) below. 
𝐺7𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑖,𝑡𝑗 =
𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ ∆𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∙ ∆𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∙ ∆𝐶𝑅_𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟_1𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 ∙ ∆𝐶𝑅_𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟_2𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 ∙ ∆𝐶𝑅_𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟_3𝑡−1  + 𝛽6 ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙_𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡   
                (2B) 
Where G7BankFlows are the quarterly changes in foreign claims of G7 countries’ banks against 55 emerging market countries. CR and 
Outlook are sovereign credit ratings and outlooks of the emerging market countries debt denominated in local currencies. ΔCR_Spillover_1, 
ΔCR_Spillover_2 and ΔCR_Spillover_3 are average local currency rating changes of the other three regions. The control variables 
incorporate country-specific variables. Numbers in braces are p-values.  
***Significant at the 1% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 




TABLE 4. – Continued 
 
Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK US
Panel C. Africa and Middle East
∆CR_LC 0.0023 -0.2032 -2.442** 0.0051 -0.3039* 0.1178 -0.8258**
{.8633} {.7391} {.0385} {.9951} {.0501} {.3235} {.0203} 
∆Outlook_LC 0.0147 -0.0205 0.5178 -0.9829 -0.441 -0.0382 -0.0313
{.7631} {.9926} {.9036} {.7454} {.4328} {.9297} {.9807} 
Spillover from Asia Pacific 0.0332* 0.1491 1.4368 -0.5506 0.242 0.2117 0.6685
{.0781} {.9380} {.5275} {.8222} {.3966} {.2943} {.3158} 
Spillover from  Latin America -0.1388* -20.4779** -46.9858*** -25.2579** -3.3192*** -2.0701** -11.0872***
{.0793} {.0109} {.0000} {.0141} {.0056} {.0146} {.0001} 
Spillover from  Africa and Middle East
Spillover from Eastern Europe -0.036 -3.5809 -2.2489 -4.424 -0.6206 0.2322 -0.7318
{.2073} {.2181} {.5146} {.2342} {.1521} {.4484} {.4692} 
Principal Component 0*** 0.0004*** 0.003*** 0.0001 0.0002*** 0.0001** 0.0009***
{.0000} {.0028} {.0000} {.4880} {.0000} {.0130} {.0000} 
Nobs 864 864 864 864 864 864 864 
Panel D. Eastern Europe
∆CR_LC 0.0046 0.287*** 0.7388*** 0.1978* 1.0261*** 0.3069 1.9999***
{.9556} {.0098} {.0000} {.0658} {.0000} {.1816} {.0031} 
∆Outlook_LC 0.6764 2.0141** 4.5515*** 0.9796 4.7725*** 2.8125 12.4444**
{.3072} {.0236} {.0006} {.2511} {.0007} {.1232} {.0227} 
Spillover from Asia Pacific 0.5109** 0.8031*** 1.1511*** 0.6245** 0.5745*** 0.742 2.0298**
{.0174} {.0000} {.0000} {.0318} {.0003} {.2181} {.0467} 
Spillover from  Latin America -1.306 -5.1762*** -9.7024*** -3.1944*** -5.201*** -6.1053** -21.3273***
{.1387} {.0000} {.0000} {.0075} {.0000} {.0136} {.0000} 
Spillover from  Africa and Middle East 0.146 -1.6079*** -3.1344*** -0.9321 -2.3509*** -2.6133 -12.4069***
{.8093} {.0038} {.0000} {.2550} {.0000} {.1235} {.0000} 
Spillover from Eastern Europe
Principal Component 0.0003*** 0.0013*** 0.0012*** 0.0004*** 0.0017*** 0.0024*** 0.0053***
{.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} 
Nobs 1080 1080 1080 1080 1080 1080 1080 
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TABLE 5. Sub-sample Analysis of Foreign Currency Spillover Effects: 1995-2003 and 2004-2008 
 
 
Note: This table presents the estimated regional rating spillover coefficients for foreign-currency-denominated sovereign rating revisions in 
emerging market regions over two sub-samples: Q1: 1995 – Q4: 2003 and Q1: 2004 – Q4: 2008 (from Eq. (2A). Numbers in braces are p-
values. 
***Significant at the 1% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
*Significant at the 10% level.  
Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK US Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK US
Panel A. Asia Pacific
Spillover from  Latin America -2.3291*** -16.6787*** -21.8614*** -1.9264*** -46.1828*** -59.8286*** -26.6911*** -5.7782*** -51.3016*** -49.7027*** -4.9175** -62.1031*** 179.7099*** -89.9621***
{.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0085} {.0012} {.0000} {.0140} {.0015} {.0017} {.0001} 
Spillover from  Africa and Middle East -0.132 -3.3364*** -2.0863 -0.4648* -10.7735 -12.7205*** -4.5137*** -0.0886 -7.0024 -11.4028 -0.4318 -14.4832 -33.2309 -24.5426*
{.6525} {.0000} {.1791} {.0609} {.1376} {.0021} {.0014} {.9457} {.4572} {.1118} {.7153} {.2112} {.3311} {.0693} 
Spillover from Eastern Europe 1.5553*** 12.9656*** 15.4984*** 1.0295*** 22.37*** 51.6235*** 20.2972*** -0.7886 -12.2228** -8.9832** -0.8789 -14.576** -41.4742** -23.7132***
{.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0001} {.0039} {.0000} {.0000} {.3010} {.0269} {.0327} {.2070} {.0319} {.0366} {.0024} 
Nobs 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 220 220 220 220 220 220 220
Panel B. Latin America
Spillover from Asia Pacific 0.0394* 0.3666*** 0.5028* 0.0688*** 0.1587*** 0.2337 0.3553** -0.0468 -3.41 -2.8838 -0.0138 0.1795 7.447 -0.9884
{.0541} {.0091} {.0969} {.0000} {.0021} {.1530} {.0241} {.7547} {.1455} {.1403} {.9642} {.8449} {.5591} {.4704} 
Spillover from  Africa and Middle East 0.0441 -1.5682*** -2.5964*** -0.2479*** -0.5724*** -1.5808*** -1.3223*** 0.1005 -5.3137** -6.5187*** -0.545* -0.6043 7.721 -3.0859**
{.4213} {.0000} {.0014} {.0000} {.0000} {.0003} {.0019} {.5323} {.0349} {.0019} {.0982} {.5399} {.5731} {.0362} 
Spillover from Eastern Europe 0.1437** 3.0114*** 5.0114*** 0.2488*** 0.8718*** 3.1071*** 2.5186*** -0.1756** -4.809*** -4.4741*** -0.3992** -1.1719** -15.6908** -2.7002***
{.0124} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0444} {.0004} {.0001} {.0260} {.0290} {.0352} {.0007} 
Nobs 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 160 160 160 160 160 160 160
Panel C. Africa and Middle East
Spillover from Asia Pacific 0.0285*** 0.4574** 1.68** -0.2489 0.2258*** 0.174 0.664*** 0.1544 0.7855 -9.8133 0.5053 1.1638 0.0836 -0.2424
{.0003} {.0172} {.0241} {.5987} {.0000} {.1184} {.0014} {.1426} {.9224} {.2474} {.9603} {.4584} {.9387} {.9368} 
Spillover from  Latin America -0.0325 -4.844*** -21.4355*** -6.5001*** -1.2033*** -1.7414*** -4.3119*** -0.3152* -41.3609*** -68.0814*** -49.1681*** -5.7066** -2.2025 -17.0349***
{.2217} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0000} {.0955} {.0047} {.0000} {.0076} {.0443} {.2620} {.0020} 
Spillover from Eastern Europe 0.0188 4.5338*** 17.5319*** 5.4279*** 0.6098*** 1.2987*** 3.3976*** -0.0811 -8.5157 -16.3745*** -9.3896 -1.6933 -0.7906 -3.6053*
{.4125} {.0000} {.0000} {.0001} {.0000} {.0001} {.0000} {.2435} {.1149} {.0036} {.1673} {.1058} {.2752} {.0759} 
Nobs 544 544 544 544 544 544 544 320 320 320 320 320 320 320
Panel D. Eastern Europe
Spillover from Asia Pacific 0.4523** 0.616*** 0.9425*** 0.2514 0.3095*** 0.8078** 2.2006* -0.2641 -2.1934** -4.8178*** -1.2228*** -3.2184*** -2.5561 -17.8947***
{.0100} {.0012} {.0056} {.3387} {.0015} {.0494} {.0574} {.2767} {.0283} {.0000} {.0053} {.0011} {.2850} {.0000} 
Spillover from  Latin America -2.2241*** -3.9187*** -7.6524*** -4.1688*** -4.5805*** -5.0522*** -19.656*** -0.8404** -5.0318*** -7.7381*** -0.6285 -4.7204*** 0.373 3.6381
0.00011262 0 0 0.00000135 0 0.00018372 0.00000023 0.04415907 0.0031428 0.00000103 0.39838275 0.00699476 0.92705284 0.28221834
Spillover from  Africa and Middle East -0.756 -0.8644* -1.6197* -0.8406 -0.7711*** -0.8978 -6.8866** -0.4657* -2.9045** -6.114*** -2.1675*** -3.7231*** -6.0738** -21.1842***
{.1104} {.0922} {.0769} {.2349} {.0052} {.4172} {.0273} {.0930} {.0109} {.0000} {.0000} {.0010} {.0259} {.0000} 
Nobs 680 680 680 680 680 680 680 400 400 400 400 400 400 400
1995 to 2003 2004 - 2008
